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UZBEKISTAN IN MODERN WORLD
Gregory R. Copley
Uzbekistan Re-Emerges as the Strategic
“Heartland of the Heartland”*
Gregory R. Copley, President, The International Strategic Studies Association.
Uzbekistan is emerging as the  “strategic surprise  player”, galvanizing
the Silk Road and Central Asia.
Central Asia is still, and once again, the
pivot of the “world island”, as British geog-
rapher Sir Halford Mackinder indicated in
his 1904 Royal Geographical Society article
[1]. And now — as with the  14th Century
age  of Timurlaine  [2] — Uzbekistan has re-
emerged as “the heartland of the heartland”.
 Significantly, Uzbekistan has been largely
ignored in strategic thinking by the West-
ern, mainly maritime, powers because it is one of only two nation-states
which is doubly landlocked; that is, it must cross two other states to reach
the sea. For the first 66 of its now 96 years of its existence as a modern
republic (starting in 1924 with the creation of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic), it was also submerged within the Soviet Empire. And yet Uz-
bekistan is re-emerging with much of its deep historical identity as the
nation of Timur, not just as a significant new Eurasian continental influence,
but also as a significant aspect of the Indian Ocean strategic matrix [3].
Uzbekistan and its post-Soviet Central Asian neighbors have devel-
oped sophisticated state  structures, including armed forces and foreign
* The article is published with permission of the author. The original article was published in the journal «Strategic Policy»,
1, 2020.
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policy and intelligence capabilities, as well as a modern transportation
and communications infrastructure, and more  market-related economies
since 1990. But Uzbekistan has, since late 2016, begun to punch above
its weight in regional and world affairs, and in shaping a market economy
more attuned than many of its neighbors to the global environment.
The Cold War of 1945-1990 reaffirmed the centrality of Mackinder’s
theory, with the constant battle by the Western powers over more than
four decades to  ensure  that a Sino-Soviet rift could be  exploited to  avoid
dominance  of Eurasia by a communist partnership. It succeeded.
Today — although the West forgot its Cold War/Mackinderish les-
sons and pushed post-Soviet Russia into the arms of the People’s Repub-
lic of China by rejecting acceptance of Russia into the West — the
former Soviet states of Central Asia have begun, on their own, to coalesce
into a bloc. And at the heart of that bloc is Uzbekistan.
It is a bloc which geopolitically provides a wedge of separation of
Russia and the PRC, and, significantly, becomes part of the greater
Indian Ocean trading basin as well as a decisive  factor within Eurasia. But
by creating a cohesive alliance of inter-
dependent Central Asian states — a proc-
ess significantly advanced by the
Tashkent Summit of November 29, 2019
— the bloc also contributes to the eco-
nomic wellbeing of both Russia and the
PRC, offsetting for both those powers
the reality that the Central Asian states
also serve to break up the monolithic
dominance of the “world island”.
It would be difficult for this group-
ing to attain cohesion and strategic impact without Uzbekistan.
The Central Asian region began a new era with the collapse of the
Union of Soviet So-cialist Republics in 1990-91. Most of the states are
now in the second generation of transformation since that time. Even
though the transitional period of Uzbek economic growth from 1990 (the
Uzbek Parliament on August 20, 1990, declared the country a sovereign
entity) until 2016 was highly significant, it was with the death of founding
Pres. Islam Karimov (announced on September 2, 2016) that Uzbekistan
moved to a truly new era. The effects of the 2016 transition on Uz-
bekistan’s society and capabilities were almost as profound as the decla-
ration of independence in 1990, even though the nominal GDP ranking of
the country suffered badly in the first couple of years of the post-Kari-
mov era as incoming Pres. Shavkat Mirziyoyev — the former Prime Min-
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ister — moved to positively transform the levels of public trust in the
Government by eliminating areas of corruption and inefficiency.
Uzbekistan, freed from the USSR, re-
mained under Pres. Karimov a command
economy, gradually modernizing. But with
the move to Pres. Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan
moved rapidly to become a market econo-
my and an open, liberal democracy. What
has been surprising has been the  speed and
calmness with which this transition has occurred, particularly with the
effectiveness of moves toward a relatively corruption-free business envi-
ronment, and the holding of truly transparent parliamentary elections on
December 22, 2019.
The International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) undertook a
monitoring mission on these elections, which were not only pronounced
as free, fair, and transparent, but also a model of sound electoral practice.
The evolution of stable, representative governance in Uzbekistan is evi-
dent, and popular participation in the  process was well in evidence  dur-
ing the election.
Today, the capital, Tashkent, and other Uzbekistan cities are alive
with activity. Investment is growing dramatically along with the forma-
tion of new capital markets. Inward tourism has soared, unsurprisingly
given the significant and spectacular attractions of Samarkand, Bukhara,
and the Silk Road destinations in the Ferghana Valley.
Paralleling the  rise  in tourism (numbers doubled from 2017 to  2018,
to  some  five-million; and grew again substantially in 2019), the  security,
crime, and corruption situations also transformed for the better. The
relative freedom of narco-traffickers, coming from Afghanistan to transit
Uzbekistan, was ended; business practices, particularly with the Govern-
ment, became increasingly transparent.
The transformation of the society was, by the end of 2019, becoming
profound, and the  implication for Uzbekistan’s strategic future  was equally
significant. Most Uzbeks in 1990 spoke at least Uzbek and Russian and
possibly one more dialect; today, with a growing emphasis on foreign
language education from the earliest levels, most Uzbeks speak additional
languages. English is widely used.
Uzbekistan does not have the largest economy of the five landlocked
former Russian/Soviet Central Asian states, but it has overwhelmingly
the largest population. In-deed, most states in the region are still recov-
ering economically after the declines which hit the region — and much of
the world — in 2013-14. But Uzbekistan remains the geo-political cross-
Uzbekistan in Modern World
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roads linking the region to the south and the Indian Ocean, and in the
East-West Silk Road, and it remains a cultural heartland.
Pop. 2020 GDP 2018
Uzbekistan 33.24m $50.50bn
Kazakhstan 18.78m $179.34bn
Turkmenistan 6.03m $40.76bn
Tajikistan 9.54m $7.52bn
Kyrgyz Rep. 6.52m $8.09bn
When stability reaches a notch higher in southern neighbor Afghani-
stan, it will be the rail links from Uzbekistan which will link Central Asia
through Afghanistan to Pakistan and thence to the Indian Ocean ports of
Gwadar and Karachi. At that point, the strategic bloc of Central Asia will
start to incorporate two other “stans”: Afghanistan and Pakistan. As
well, the bloc is already linked across the Caspian Sea with Azerbaijan.
The missing piece of the geopolitical jigsaw, for the moment, is Iran.
India has hopes of reaching into Central Asia via rail links it is sponsoring
from the Iranian Indian Ocean (Arabian Sea) port of Chah Bahar, north-
ward along Iran’s eastern frontier and into Afghanistan. But the evolu-
tion of that link awaits a resolution of Iranian strategic isolation.
In 1939, as World War II was erupting in the West, Uzbekistan had a
population of only 6.55-million. Indeed, at that time the identity of the
nation as Uzbekistan was only some 15 years old. The Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republic was formed in 1924. Despite this, the Uzbeks in the
Red Army suffered 330,000 military deaths in World War II, fighting away
from their territory for the USSR in the war against Germany. Another
220,000 Uzbek civilians died in the  war. But, in some  measure  of com-
pensation, the war saw the Soviet Union move much of its industry east
of the Ural Mountains and into Central Asia, to protect it against the
German invasion.
But it would be a mistake to believe that the identity of the Uzbek
people and their capability for unified action stemmed from the creation
of that Uzbek soviet state in 1924.
The  Uzbeks descend from a Mongol- Turkic people  who  inhabited
the  region which later became  part of Turkestan in the  15th Century.
Even then, the region had been a major trading area along the overland
routes to  China. In the  14th Century, Samarkand had become  the  hub of
Timurlaine’s vast empire. Before  that, in 1220, the  region had been overrun
by Mongols under Genghis Khan. The Uzbeks consolidated in the 16th
Century and gradually established a system of khanates and emirates.
Gregory R. Copley
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The area did not come under the control of the Russian Empire until
the 1860s. The emirates of Khiva and Bukhara became protectorates of
the  Russian Tsar and the  region became  known as Turkestan.
The fall of the Tsar in 1917 led to instability and a series of revolts
against the new Russian overlords, the bolsheviks. The bolshevik Red
Army conquered the region in 1920, bringing it into the new USSR. The
Soviets divided Turkestan into  the  republics of Turkmenia (now Turk-
menistan) and Uzbekistan. The Soviet objective was to create identities
loyal to  Moscow, not to  pan-Turkism.
While by then impoverished, the Uzbek Republic was rich in minerals
and agricultural lands and the  Soviet Union continued the  old imperial
system of extracting its raw materials for the benefit of industry else-
where in Moscow’s domains. For example, it provided 30 percent of the
gold mined in the USSR. Even today, gold remains Uzbekistan’s most
valuable  source  of foreign earnings, along with oil and gas, and followed
by rapidly-expanding high-value  agricultur-
al exports and tourism.
In the  manufacturing sector, Uzbekistan’s
automotive industry — established since 1992
— is now building some 200,000 vehicles a
year, exporting to Russia and other CIS (Com-
monwealth of Independent States) nations.
The industry, built around GM Uzbekistan
(of which General Motors in the US owns 25 percent), UzDaewooAuto,
and SamKochAvto, imports steel coil from Russia and advanced technol-
ogy parts from the Republic of Korea, significantly integrating the coun-
try into  the  Eurasian (Silk Road) supply chain. A separate  company,
GM Powertrain Uzbekistan, in which GM of the US has a 52 percent
stake, is producing auto engines for global export.
Within the Ministry of Health, an Agency on Development of the
Pharmaceutical Industry has been created to help attract foreign invest-
ment and technology into the expansion of a major pharmaceuticals sector
which aims to  service  much of Eurasia.
By the 1980s Uzbekistan also produced two-thirds of Soviet cotton.
As the prestige of local politicians and managers was tied in with this,
more  extreme  measures were  taken to  expand production. Heavy use  of
fertilizers caused widespread pollution and health problems. Associated
irrigation schemes created an ecological disaster in the Aral Sea and the
rivers flowing into it.
The 26,300 square miles (68,000 sq. km) Aral Sea, which extends from
Kazakhstan into Uzbekistan’s autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan,
Uzbekistan in Modern World
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was still complete in its water area at 1960, but was virtually without
water by 2016. It had been the  fourth largest body of inland water, with
an average depth of 53 ft (16m), but with a maximum depth of 226 feet
(69m) off the western shore. The disappearance of the Aral Sea, due to
the Stalin-era (early 1950s) water diversions of the two major rivers
feeding the Aral Sea — the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya — to cotton
irrigation was one of the largest human-engineered environmental disas-
ters on record.
But the issue is now being
addressed, both in Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan,
which holds the northern portion
of the Aral, the World Bank, in
the 1990s, funded an $87-million
project to build a 12km (7.5
mile) dyke — the Kokaral Dam,
completed in 2005 — across the
narrow channel linking the North
Aral Sea with the South. This
captured what little  water was
flowing into the Sea. And then,
with improvements to existing channels of the Syr Darya river, which
flows northward from the Kazakh side of the Tien Shan Mountains, the
flow of water into the North Aral improved. Water levels in the North
Aral rose 3.3m in seven months after the dam was completed, and the
fishing in-dustry resumed. A plan to raise the height of the dam, and
therefore the North Aral Sea, is progressing.
In the South, in the Uzbek Republic of Karakalpakstan, the issue is
more difficult, so the initial task has been to address human concerns in
the region as a first priority; then ecological concerns regarding the sta-
bilization of the seabed with plant life; and then finding ways to improve
the  efficiency of irrigation methods to  ensure  that agriculture  can be
sustained while restoring water flow back to the Aral. All three aspects
have made significant progress, and my visit to the South Aral Sea port
city of Muynaq with Jusipbek Sidikbekovich Kazbekov, First Deputy
Chair on Environment and Develop-ment of the Aral Sea Region in the
Karakalpakstan Council of Ministers, gave strong evidence of that. Kaz-
bekov was trained at the University of Colorado in irrigation engineering.
The once nearly-abandoned city of Muynaq has been dramatically revived,
and the fish-ing industry and grazing have re-started in and around the lakes
of the region. The economy and the ecology are on the move again.
Gregory R. Copley
As with everything else in the country,
the Armed Forces and security services
underwent a profound modernization
when Pres. Mirziyoyev took office. A new
defense doctrine was approved by law on
January 9, 2018, which showed a distinct
orientation toward information warfare
and psychological operations in support of
conventional and unconventional warfare.
It also showed a focus on advanced
technology capabilities and operations to
counter disruptions to state infrastructure
and to manage transborder issues.
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In the strategic sector, highly-professional and well-funded think-
tanks support the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies functions under the Presi-
dent; the Center for International Relations Studies functions under the
Foreign Minister. The  University of World Economy and Diplomacy func-
tions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a dedicated Center for
International Economic and Political Studies.
In the defense sector, Uzbekistan inherited a manpower base trained
in the  Soviet Armed Forces, along with an array of Soviet equipment. It
had, on independence in 1990, created a Ministry on Matters of Defense,
which soon reorganized as the Ministry of Defense. And on January 14,
1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted a resolution taking all
military units, military educational institutions, organizations and other
military establishments within the country under the Uzbek Government.
But, as with everything else in the country, the Armed Forces and
security services underwent a profound modernization when Pres. Mirzi-
yoyev took office. A new defense doctrine was approved by law on Janu-
ary 9, 2018, which showed a distinct orientation toward information war-
fare and psychological operations in support of conventional and uncon-
ventional warfare. It also showed a focus on advanced technology capabil-
ities and operations to  counter disruptions to  state  infrastructure  and to
manage transborder issues.
In August 2017, Pres. Mirziyoyev issued a presidential decree to re-
move the National Guard, the internal paramilitary policing organiza-
tion, as one of the military’s branches of service and made it an independ-
ent institution, but placed under the Defense Ministry as of January
2018. In July 2019, the Government amended its criminal code, giving
the Guard expanded authority.
There had been military basing and training in Uzbek territory for the
best part of a century, and much of it was, after independence, incorporat-
ed into the Academy of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, established in
1994, to serve all branches of the Uzbek Armed Forces (Ground Forces,
Air and Air Defense Forces, and Naval [riverine] Force). It incorporated
the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School of the Soviet era,
and is housed in an extensive facility in Tashkent, where significant
dedicated faculties specifically focus on the
military practices of Eurasian (including
Western Europe-an) and global military
operators.
The Academy — which functions at of-
ficer training, command and staff, and war
Uzbekistan in Modern World
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college levels — focuses strongly on the 3,000 years of military history of
the  country, with the  iconic presence  of Amir Timur setting an identity
for the Armed Forces. Many senior serving Uzbek officers have had exten-
sive  combat experience  during the  Soviet era, particularly with opera-
tions in Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan’s Armed Forces have consistently been ranking highly in
professionalism, particularly with the Mirziyoyev reforms which have giv-
en real impetus to  pay, conditions, military education, and equipment.
Uzbekistan revises perspectives on what is now possible in Central
Asia. And this in turn will nuance  the  new strategic debate  globally.
Footnotes:
1. Mackinder, Sir Halford John: “The Geographical Pivot of History”,
article for the Royal Geographical Society, London, 1904. He described
the  “world island” as comprising the  interlinked continents of Europe,
Asia, and Africa (Afro-Eurasia), and the  heartland at the  center of this,
stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the
Arctic. In 1919, Mackinder summarized his theory as: “Who rules East
Europe  commands the  Heartland; who  rules the  Heartland commands
the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world”,
because by his estimates the “world island” would control more than 50
percent of the  world’s resources.
2. Timur (1336-1405), the  founder of the  Timurid Empire  in Persia
and Central Asia, was born and was buried in what is now the  Republic
of Uzbekistan. He  was known during his lifetime  as Amir (or Emir: noble
leader, commander) Timur, or Timur-i lang (Timurlaine  or Tamerlaine),
Persian for Timur the  Lame. He  shared an ancestor with Genghis Khan
(d. 1227), the  Mongol conqueror. Timur conquered more  territory than
anyone else but Alexander the Great. Towards the end of his reign,
Timur con-trolled all the  remnants of the  Chagatai Khanate, the  Ilkha-
natate, and the Golden Horse. He also at-tempted to restore the Yuan
dynasty in China. He was born at Kesh, some 50 miles south of Samar-
kand, the son of a lesser chief of the Barlas tribe, and it was through him
that Timur claimed to  be  a descendant of Tumbinai Setsen, a male-line
ancestor he shared in common with Genghis Khan.
3. See, Copley, Gregory R.: “Central Asian Events Mark a Significant
Strategic Shift” in Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, December
2, 2019.
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